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THE SEESAW PRINCIPLE IN
INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY
ABSTRACT
The standard analysis of the optimal international tax policy of a small countrytypically
assumesthat the country either imports or exports capital, but does not do both. This paper
considers the situation in which a small country both exports and imports capital and can alter
its tax on one or the other, but not both. In each case, a "seesaw" relationship is identified, in
which the optimal tax on the income from capital exports (imports) is inversely related to the
given tax rate on income from capital imports (exports). The standard results for optimal
taxation of capital exports and imports are shown to be special cases of the more general seesaw
principle.
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NEW ZEALANDTHE SEESAW PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY
1.Introduction
The normative literature on taxation of capital income flows typically divides into
two streams of analysis, separately deriving the optimal tax on income from capital
exports and the optimal tax on income from capital imports. Apart from the usual
references to the pure residence and pure source principles of international tax,
the two "arms" of international tax policy are rarely analysed as an integrated
whole. The aim of this paper is to analyse the linkages that arise between the two
arms of international tax policy when a country cannot fully optimise its
international tax system. We focus on efficiency issues and do not consider equity
or tax avoidance concerns.
The motivation for this approach arises from the constraints that policy makers
face. For example, tax treaties constrain countries in how they tax capital exports.
Similarly, the presence of foreign tax credits will generally make it undesirable to
apply the classical capital import tax.
In the case of capital exports, the classical result in the literature shows that small
capital exporting countries maximise national income when they tax net offshore
income (i.e. income after foreign taxes are deducted) at the same rate as domestic
income.1 This is often called the national welfare maximisation (NWM) approach
to taxing capital exports. For a small capital importing economy, the classical
result is that the optimal tax at the margin on capital imports is zero (in the
absence of foreign tax credits provided by the exporting country).2
This note shows that each of these results change when the other tax is not set at
the optimal rate. The national welfare maximising tax on capital exports (p4
depends on how residents are taxed on their domestic capital stock (Md) relative to
1 While the classical results have been known for some time, for example see Richman (1963),
the first simple analytical derivation was provided by Feldstein & Hartman (1979).
2 Both Gordon (1986) and Gersovitz (1987) provide simple analytical derivations, while
Macoougall (1960) and Corden (1974) present graphical analyses of optimal taxation of
capital imports.how capital imports are taxed (l.Lm). Similarly, the optimal ja depends on (lix) and
(l.-j)• The relationship can be expressed in the general form:3
(1 Mm)O — Mx) = (1—Mo)
We characterise the above expression as a "seesaw", as it shows that, for a given
domestic tax rate (p..j), higher taxes on capital exports require lower taxes on
capital imports, and vice versa. A seesaw type relationship occurs regardless of
whether the deduction or credit methods of double tax relief are used by the
countries involved.
Intuition for the seesaw principle is straightforward, being simply an application of
the standard theoretical result that the welfare losses from a tax can, in some
circumstances, be offset by the imposition of another tax. In this case, part of the
welfare losses accruing from a suboptimal tax on capital imports can be offset by
imposing a "suboptimal" tax on capital exports, and vice versa!t
This is most easily explained for the case of a small, capital-importing country.
Such a country faces an infinitely elastic supply of foreign savings at some interest
rate r. If the tax on capital imports is fixed, and domestic and foreign capital are
perfect substitutes in domestic production, then the domestic capital stock is fixed
and changes in capital exports induce corresponding changes in capital imports.
In this situation, the domestic country can increase its income by expanding both
exports and imports of capital, leaving the domestic capital stock unchanged, if the
social return from capital exports exceeds the social cost of capital imports.5
Similarly, when the social return from capital exports is less than the social cost of
capital imports, the domestic country can increase its income by reducing equally
its exports and imports. The seesaw principle simply describes the combinations
of g, lid and M which ensure that domestic residents - seeking to maximise the
after-tax (private) returns from their investments - exploit all opportunities for
socially profitable arbitrage of exports and imports of capital.6
Note, 11m + J.1 = I-k approximates the seesaw relationship described in the text.
4
Readers unfamiliar with international tax may gain some insight for the seesaw result by
drawing an analo9y with tariff compensation arguments in the international trade literature.
See Corden (1974) and Clements & Sjaastad (1984).
We find it useful to refer to the simultaneous increase in capital exports and capital imports
as "social arbitrage', since the domestic economy is effectively obtaining capital from the
foreign country at some interest rate and reinvesting it in the foreign country at a higher after-
tax interest rate. Inconsistent tax treatment of the capital inflow with respect to the capital
outflow produces such socially-profitable arbitrage opportunities for the domestic country.
2In some situations the first best option for a small open economy may involve
taxing income derived from inward foreign investment. This occurs when other
countries provide foreign tax credits to their capital exporters, which an importing
country can only benefit from if it taxes those exporters. Interestingly, our results
show that, with a fixed tax rate on capital imports, foreign tax credits received on
capital Imports are irrelevant for choosing optimal capital export taxes. The
reverse does not hold, however. The optimal value for the capital import tax (with
a fixed tax on capital exports) equals the maximum of either: (1) available foreign
tax credits, or (2) the value of pm suggested by the seesaw principle. The
underlying rationale for these results is given In the body of the paper.
The next section discusses related developments in the literature. The basic
model for the subsequent analysis is presented in Section 3. Section 4 analyses
the optimal tax on capital exports assuming taxes are fixed on capital imports.
Section 5 reverses the situation, and derives the optimal tax on capital imports
given that taxes on capital exports are fixed. Section 6 analyses national welfare
maximisation when a country is free to choose both taxes. Conclusions and
directions for further research are presented in Section 7.
2.Related Uterature
The literature on optimal international taxation is usefully divided into two separate
strands. One strand focuses on the situation where one or more of the countries
is large, with results analogous to optimal tariff theory in international trade (Kemp
(1962 & 1966), Jones (1967), Feldstein & Hartman (1979)). Where both countries
are large, opportunities for strategic interaction between countries arise, and
relations between capital import taxes imposed by one country and capital export
taxes imposed by the other country are derived (Hamada (1966), Bond &
Samuelson (1989) and Gordon (1992)).
The second strand focuses on optimal international taxation for small open
economies that either export or import capital, but not both. The classical results
referred to in the Introduction fall within this strand. As Bruce (1992) has recently
made clear, two alternative approaches can be used to derive the classical results:
either (1) one can assume that the total wealth of residents of each country is
fixed, or (2) one can assume that optimal taxes are levied on both labor income
and economic profits so that the Diamond and Mirilees (1971) production
efficiency results hold.
6 Note that the arbitrage behaviour in this model does not require individual firms (or people) to
simuftaneously export and import capital. Rather, the act of one firm exporting an extra
dollar of capital Induces another firm to import a dollar of capital.
3Under the first approach, if taxes are imposed on capital owned by domestic
residents, regardless of location, they will fall entirely on savers and no deadweight
losses are imposed on the economy. As a result, the optimal capital export and
capital import taxes for a small open economy are also characterised by zero
deadweight losses.
More specifically, when total wealth is fixed, an extra dollar of capital exports
reduces the domestic capital stock by one dollar, so that the opportunity cost of
capital exports is simply the marginal product of capital.In this situation, the
optimal capital export tax for a small open economy occurs when the social return
from capital exports equals the marginal product of capital (i.e., zero deadweight
losses).7 This is achieved when residents are taxed on their offshore income, net
of foreign taxes, at the same rate as they are taxed on their domestic income.
Similarly, zero deadweight losses on capital imports occur when capital imports
are taxed at a zero rate (assuming no foreign tax credits).
Subsequent developments in the literature relaxed the assumption of fixed total
wealth, which alters the opportunity cost of capital exports. In Dutton (t982),8 the
opportunity cost of capital exports is a combination of:
(1) a weighted average of pre- and after- tax rates of returns on domestic capital,
since an extra dollar of capital exports now draws capital partly from new
savings as well as domestic production; and,
(2) the extent to which the after-tax return differs from the "Golden Rule' growth
rate, n.If the capital-labour ratio is below (above) the level necessary to
sustain economic growth at rate n, then an extra dollar of capital exports can
push the economy closer to (away from) n.9
The optimal capital export tax in Dutton's model is where the social return from
capital exports equals the opportunity cost of capital exports, which implies zero
The social return on capital exports equals the pre-tax return less foreign taxes, whereas the
private return to capital exporters equals the pre-tax return less all taxes.
8
Horst (1 980) previously analysed the implications of introducing a domestic savings elasticity,
but did so from a world welfare perspective, whereas Dutton focuses on national welfare.
Dutton (1986) extends the analyses to an overlapping generation model.
9 Based on Feldstein (1978). taxes on capital income alter the relative prices of present and
future consumption, and thereby alter the life-cycle distribution of consumption. With variable
total wealth, an extra doflar of capital exports raises pre-tax and after-tax returns on domestic
capital. The higher after-tax returns push the rate of time preference closer to (or away from)
the tolden Rule* growth path.
4deadweight losses on capital exports.10 But as Findlay (1986, p.208) points out,
zero deadweight losses are not optimal when total wealth is variable. Instead, the
optimal capital export tax is where marginal deadweight losses on capital exports
equal marginal deadweight losses on domestic capital income tax (for a fixed
revenue target). Similarly for the optimal capital-import tax. Unless savings are
totally inelastic, the optimal capital export and capital import taxes are not the
same as in the classical analysis. But as Bruce (1992) shows, this may require
negative taxes on international capital income (i.e., a subsidy).
More specifically, in Findlay's model the government must impose distortionary
taxes on residents' domestic capital income to raise revenue. This reduces saving
below its optimal level but leaves investment unaffected because of the infinitely
elastic supply of foreign savings to the domestic economy. Imposing some tax on
capital imports becomes optimal because it raises pre-tax returns in the domestic
economy, which reduces the domestic capital stock below its optimal level but
increases domestic savings toward its optimal level. Thus, the optimal tax on
capital imports involves trading off the welfare losses from reducing the domestic
capital stock against the welfare gains from reducing the savings distortion. This
countervailing aspect of capital import taxes on other tax distortions plays a critical
role in the seesaw principle established in the current paper.
A completely different approach to the above literature is to assume that both labor
income and economic profits are taxed optimally. Provided all capital income
taxes fall entirely on saving, the capital/labor tax mix will already be optimal and so
any attempt to use capital import or capital export taxes to lighten the tax burden
on saving (as in Findlay) will be suboptimal. This means that the classical results
for capital imports and exports are optimal even when total wealth is variable (see
Gordon (1986)).11
10Under Dutton's formulation, factor (1) in the previous paragraph makes the opportunity cost
of capital lower than the marginal product of capital. The optimal capital export tax is
therefore below the level suggested by the classical result. Factor (2). however, has the
potential to raise the optimal tax rate above the classical result.Indeed,with some moderate
parameters Dutton shows in a footnote that the optimal tax on capital exports would be 64%
when the domestic tax rate is 33%.
11Another, and perhaps more direct, explanation is provided by Bruce (1992). A small capital-
importing countiy faces a perfectly elastic supply of capital imports, which means that any
taxes levied on capital imports are fully shifted onto immobile factors, such as labor. The
higher indirect tax burden on labor has the same effect as taxing labor directly, but in addition
the capital import lax distorts investment levels. The latter can be avoided without iniposing
other costs by exempting capital imports and taxing labor directly. Taxing income from
capital exports (net of foreign taxes) at the same rate as domestic income avoids similar
investment distortions.
5The correct approach depends on which assumptions are realistic. For instance, if
labor taxes are suboptimal and cannot be made optimal, then international taxes
can be used as second-best devices to ameliorate these distortions (as suggested
by Findlay). But if policy makers do not know whether labor is taxed above or
below its optimal rate, then the approach followed by Gordon (1986) might be just
as realistic.
The above models assume that a country cannot be both a capital exporter and
capital importer. This is a significant shortcoming of the existing literature, since
simultaneous exporting and importing of capital fundamentally alters the
opportunity cost of capital exports. When the supply of foreign savings to the
domestic economy is perfectly elastic, the opportunity cost of capital is given by
the (fixed) world after-tax return on capital, and the domestic saving and
production effects analysed by Dutton (1982) and Findlay (1986) become
irrelevant to determining the opportunity cost of capital exports. Thus, our model
differs substantially from the earlier literature. Since we want to highlight the
implications of simultaneous exporting and importing of capital and compare them
with the classical results, we assume that total wealth is fixed in each country.
Simultaneous exporting and importing of capital occurs if domestic and foreign
capital are differentiated, such as occurs when the returns to an investor depend
on specialised knowledge. But even if domestic and foreign capital were
homogeneous, simultaneous importing and exporting of capital could occur if a
country taxes capital exports in a manner that is not perfectly consistent with the
taxes it imposes on capital imports, or if foreign countries adopt inconsistent tax
policies. In this case, a country can import capital at a social cost which can be
higher or lower than the social return from exporting capital. Since most countries'
tax relationships are far from being perfectly consistent, this paper explores the
national welfare consequences of such inconsistencies and identifies the optimal
relationship between capital import taxes and capital export taxes, and vice versa.
Slemrod (1988) discusses the implications of inconsistent tax arrangements for
capital market equilibrium in a world comprising two countries. That paper shows
that with perfect capital mobility, equilibrium in the world capital market requires
that both countries must impose the same relation between taxes on exported and
domestic capital.In the absence of consistent tax policies, the potential for
unlimited arbitrage profits arises. Frenkel, Razin & Sadka (1991) make the same
point but explicitly incorporate taxes on capital imports.
Slemrod (1990) analyses national welfare maximisation in a model of two
countries (a Northern country and a Southern country) which impose "inconsistent"
tax treatments on cross border capital flows. The model assumes that Northern
residents incur monitoring costs on their investments in the South, but Southern
residents do not face monitoring costs on their investments in the North. This
6structure generates non-corner solutions, with limited arbitrage gains, for national
and world capital market equilibrium. The paper identifies the potential arbitrage
gains or losses facing the Southern country arising from inconsistent tax settings
with the Northern country, and shows that the Southern country could benefit from
imposing taxes on capital exports to the Northern country.
Our paper models simultaneous importing and exporting of capital using
essentially the same structure as in Slemrod (1990). Using this structure, we
identify explicitly the optimal relationship between taxes on capital imports and
capital exports. This leads us to the seesaw relationship that arises between the
two arms of international tax policy, which is the focus of this paper.
3.The Basic Analytical Model
We assume a two-country world, where one country is called the Southern country
and the other is the Northern country. Total wealth of each countrys
representative citizen are assumed to be fixed, and are denoted W and W,, for
the South and North, respectively. Wj denotes wealth owned by citizens of
country i and invested in country j. K, and K denote the capital stocks located in
the South and North, respectively. Thus:
WnWnn+Wp.KW0,+Wn
W =W+ W, K = W +We,.
TheNorth is assumed to be large relative to the South, so that investment by
Southern residents has no impact on Northern rates of return. In contrast,
Northern residents investing in the South affect the rates of return in the Southern
country. Let
g(Kj Southern country production function, with g >0 and (CO. The same
production function applies regardless of whether the capital is owned
by Northerners or Southerners.
= pre-tax rate of return earned on capital located in the South
= g'.
= (constant) pre-tax rate of return earned on capital located in the North.
Each country can tax its residents on their domestic and offshore income, at
separate rates if desired.Furthermore, each country can tax non-residents'
income earned within its borders. Thus, the North may impose three separate
taxes; denoted
7=tax rate on Northerners earning Northern income
=tax rate on Northerners earning Southern income
=tax rate on Southerners earning Northern income
and the South may impose three separate taxes; denoted
=tax rate on Southerners earning Southern income
=tax rate on Southerners earning Northern income
=tax rate on Northerners earning Southern income
The above set of taxes potentially result in "double taxation" of cross border capital
income. Countries use a number of different approaches to reduce double
taxation. Whatever method is used, we denote the resulting effective tax rate
imposed by both countries as:
v05 =effective tax rate on Northerners earning Southern income; and,
=effective tax rate on Southerners earning Northern income.
For simplicity, we assume all taxes are levied on an accrual basis. Thus, for
example, if the South operates a worldwide tax system with a limited foreign tax
credit then v = max (tsn,Ii). If the South operates the territorial or exemption
system,= 0 and vi,, = ;, If it operates a deduction system
(1— v5) = (I —t)(1 Rsn). Similar definitions apply in the case of the North.
It will be useful for discussion of the results to denote as lsn the net tax rate that
the South imposes on W over and above what the North imposes. This is given
by (1—n)=(1—v)/(1—t5$.
Investor Equilibrium
In a world with perfect capital mobility, Southern residents would in equilibrium
earn the same after-tax return on both Southern and Northern investments:
(la)
Similarly,equilibrium for the Northern investor requires:
(1 b) (1 — = (1 — vns)g'
8It is readily apparent that the conditions in (la) and (ib) lead to an interior world
capital market equilibrium if and only if tax rates fulfill the following constraint
(2) (1 —v,)(1 — v) —(1—t)(1—li) U = 0.
As Slemrod (1988) and Frenkel, Razin & Sadka (1991) discuss, if condition (2)
does not hold, either (la), (ib) or both, will not hold, presenting the possibility of
infinite arbitrage profits by holding a short position in the low-yielding asset and a
long position in the higher-yielding asset.In Slemrod (1988), equilibrium is
obtained by ruling out shod positions.
In reality, arbitrage opportunities are limited by factors like information costs,
portfolio risk and limited tax deductibility of interest expenses. Incorporating these
factors means that Northern and Southern capital are imperfect substitutes, and
therefore we essentially have a "two-gooC portfolio optimisation problem.12
Adopting this approach involves extra complexity without providing greater insight
to our results. As our primary objective is to draw out the key tax relationships and
compare them with the classical results under the same conditions, we continue to
treat all capital as one good and posit that there are increasing marginal costs to
Southern investment in the North. For ease of exposition, we refer to these costs
as monitoring costs, but they are more appropriately thought of as reflecting the
degree of imperfect substitutability in the model. This feature of the model
provides an interior solution to the gross capital flows across borders, and allows
for limited arbitrage opportunities.
This assumption leads us to change (la) to:
(1 c) (1 —g.)g = (1— v8)(R—c' (Wj)
whered (W5} represents the marginal monitoring cost of the cross-border
investment by Southerners.13 We assume that c' (0) = 0 and that c"> 0 for W5 >0.
In the following analysis, we focus on the case in which net cross-border capital
flows are always positive (ie.W8 >0 and W >0), which occurs when 0>0.14
12 A "twogood' model of capital flows would be analogous to a two-good international trade
model in which a country uses export subsidies to offset the adverse effects on its exports of
tariffs ft imposes on imports (i.e., "tariff compensation"). See Corden (1974) for an example
of this literature.
13Note that this treatment assumes that c' is tax deductble, which will be true for some costs-
including monitoring costs - but not for other factors such as risk premia. We adopt this
approach because ft means the classic results can be derived from the model, and therefore
the implications of the seesaw results have a straightforward interpretation.
9In this selling, inconsistent tax arrangements between the North and South drive
cross border capital flows to the point where the monitoring cost on the. marginal
investment (c') rises sufficiently to eliminate further arbitrage activity.






Since (3a) and (3b) both hold in equilibrium, we have:
(4) c'=
(1 — v5)(1 — v5)
where 0 is given in (2). Thus, c' is zero when condition (2) holds. Equation (4)
shows that consistent tax policies between the North and South (ie.8=0) eliminate
all costly capital flows, so that W5, = 0.
It is instructive to compare this equilibrium with that obtained in the standard model
under consistent tax settings. In that case the Southern resident is indifferent
between domestic and foreign investments, so that W0 is indeterminate rather
than zero. Net capital exports (W—K5) are determinate, but not gross capital
exports or imports.
4.Maxlmlslng Southern Welfare from Taxing Capital Exports
As discussed in the introduction, a classical result in the international tax literature
is that individual countries maximise national income from capital exports when
they tax net offshore income (i.e. income after foreign taxes are deducted) at the
same rate as domestic income. This is known as the deduction approach to
relieving double taxation, and it would be represented in our notation by
(1— v) = (1 —j.x)(1— t,,j, and=
14 0> 0means (hat cross border investments W5, and W,, are effectively taxed more lightly
than domestic investments, W33 and W. Less restrictive tax arrangements (e.g., 0 < 0)
could also be modelled if either (a) W5, and W,. couldtakenegative values, or (b)
Southerners incurred monitoring costs and investment risk on domestic as well as offshore
investment, so that c' ref lecled net costs and could take negative values. The underlying
logic of the results, however, does not depend on these assumptions.
10The classical result obtains because the opportunity cost of capital exports for a
country shut-off from capital imports is the marginal product of capital, g. At an
optimum, the national return to foreign investment, (1—t5)R0, should equal this
opportunity cost. The Southern investor will ensure that (1— = (1—
These two conditions generate the optimal amount of foreign investment as long
as (1—Ix)=(1—v)/(1—t5),which itdoes under a full taxation with deduction
approach.
In an economy open to capital imports, the opportunity cost of capital is a function
of the world cost of capital. In the extreme case where an extra dollar of capital
exports induces an additional dollar of capital imports, the opportunity cost of
capital equals the pre-tax return paid to imported capital less any taxes received
by the capital importing country (in this case, the South).
This situation can be analysed by defining national income in the South (Y) as:




Equation (5) reflects the fact that g' W5 of the income from local production
accrues to Northern investors; however, the South collects tax revenue on that
income so the net payment to Northerners equals (1—jg' W. Similarly, net
income accruing to Southern residents investing in the North is (1— —
where C is the average monitoring cost on these investments.
The problem at hand is for the Southern country to set taxes on its residents
investing in the North (j.x)at the level that maximises national income, assuming
all other taxes (including its own fiscal instruments g1. and p) are fixed.15 In
particular, j is constant and therefore v, is constant. This means that g' is




dK +1(1 — — c')
—(1j.tnsX1t,,r)Rn]dW. (I—V5) ( v)
15As is standard in this literature, no revenue constraint is imposed. The implicit assumption is
that the South has at its disposal other fiscal instruments which cause no excess burden, in
particular taxes on immobile factors, to meet its revenue needs.
11Since a change in LLhas no effect on the domestic capital stock (that is,
dK,/ds,,, =0),the first term Is irrelevant to this optimisation problem; it will become
relevant in section 5 when we discuss the optimal setting of i,,.,. We focus on the
second term. The first component is the marginal social return the South receives
when its residents invest in the North, and the second component is the social cost
to the South of Northerners investing in the South. Since the South's capital stock
(K,) is constant, increasing W,, by $1 increases w by $1. The South must forgo
to attract a dollar of W. Thus, an increase in W,
increases Y,, provided the social return from increasing W, exceeds the social
cost of increasing W. This net return is positive at W =0(and thus d =0)when
0>0, and measures the arbitrage gain from obtaining capital from the North and
simultaneously investing in the North. This arbitrage gain is limited because C
increases as W, increases. The South's national income is maximised when W5
is increased to the point that c' (W,} makes the marginal net social gain zero.
We can show this result formally by totally differentiating (ib) and (ic) while
holding all taxes constant, except ps, obtaining
(la) (1—v)g"dK,=0=>dK,=0,and
(7b) dW5 = —(Re—c' )dv5
since dK5 =0.
(1— v,)c"






Aftersubstituting from (3a)and(3b), and remembering that (1— a
(I—v,)/(1--t,),we canfindthe taxrates for which the equilibrium outcome is
consistent with this expression, which is
(9)(111sn)=(IM)
Equation (9) is what we call the general seesaw result for taxing capital exports.
Given the assumption that the South can not alteror p, the higher the value
ofthat the South imposes, the lower the net tax rate (llsn) the South needs to
impose on capital exports to maximise national income, and vice versa.
12Perhaps the most surprising aspect of equatiOn (9) is that it includes p and not
v1. This means that when is fixed, foreign tax credits provided by the North
have no effect on the South's optimal tax rate on capital exports.16 The reason is
that such credits are in fact a subsidy on Northern capital supplied to the South
(W,),which doesnot alter the South's tax wedge on capital imports (i.e., both the
private and social cost of capital imports decline by the same amount). The
reduction in social cost increases the optimal level of capital exports and imports,
and the reduction in private cost automatically induces private agents to achieve
the new optimum without the South altering its capital export taxes.
There are two other general points to note about equation (9). Even thoughm
can be a function of ;,, its optimal value does not depend on ;,. This means the
optimal capital export tax for the South does not depend on Northern taxes.
Second, if t> lu, then (9) requires that flsnbenegative. If rfl,, is restricted to
positive values, then the greatest welfare is obtained when i =0.
If the South utilises a deduction approach to double tax relief, then
(1— v5) =(1—i.i)(t — ;), so that (1 - llsn)=(1 - pa).It follows from (9) that the
classical result for maximising welfare from capital exports (the deduction system
with p.t = x) is optimal only when jt = 0. As long as there is positive tax on
capital imports (j.t> 0), then the optimal taxation of capital exports falls short of
full taxation with deductibility.




where X denotes foreign tax credits the South provides to its residents investing in
the North.17'18 Under a limited foreign tax credit system X = min(Rsn. ;), whereas
A=;, under a pure foreign tax credit system. Equation (10) shows that the
optimal value for p.t is increased directly by the amount of foreign tax credits, so
as to leave the net tax rate at the same level as under the deduction approach.
This conclusion does not hold in the next section, where we set to maximise Southern
income.
17As with all taxes, all foreign tax credits are assumed to be provided on an accrual basis.
We derive (10) from the fact that the net tax rate, (1— v)/(1 — r5), is identical to
(1— j1,) 1(1 — ),for both accrual methods of foreign tax relief.
13The two most commonly used methods of double tax relief around the world are
the exemption system and the limited foreign tax credit system. The exemption
approach sets t =0, which satisfies the seesaw condition only when= ii. A
limited foreign tax credit system is consistent with the seesaw condition only when
J.Lu ￿j.t. If it is desirable to levy no net tax on exports, which can be
achieved by ensuring that￿ 'r and granting a limited credit for foreign taxes.
If p<g,5, it is desirable to impose some positive net tax on exports. This can be
accomplished by setting p.t appropriately larger than ;, and offering a credit for
'tsr'.
5.Maximislng Southern Welfare from Taxing Capital Imports
The above analysis assumed that the South could set only ps,, in its effort to
maximise national income. This section analyses the reverse situation, where the
South can only alter taxes it imposes on Northerners investing in the South (l.ins),
while andare assumed fixed.
National income in the South (Y3)isagain given by equation (5). In contrast to the
previous section, equations (3a) and (3b) indicate that variations in j.tM may
change K5 and therefore g, since v is a function of p.,... The value ofwhich
rnaximises Southern income is determined by differentiating (5), holding all tax
variables constant except lj We get
(11) dY5=It4dK5+ Wdp
+[(1—t,..4(R —c')+(1Mns)(l —v) Wc"
—(1 tnn)Rn] dW5yj
(1—j.t) (I—vns)
Similarly,totally differentiating (Ic) and (ib) while holding all taxes constant except
(and therefore v) gives
(1 2a) dW5 = dK3.For later use, let & =
c"O — =—dK
(1 — v5)c" g" (1 — pifl) dW5
(12b) dK5=gdv5
(1— Vns)g"
Substituting for dK, and dW51, into (11) gives:
14(13)dY=LflSg'gdvflS+
g(1—v)






In this case, the optimal tax policy depends on the method used by the North to
eliminate double taxation. If the North operates the deduction approach to double







where S is given by (12a). Note that the optimal value for j.x, depends on the net
tax rate the South imposes on Southerners investing in the North1 Thus, if
is fixed and the South gives foreign tax credits to partially offset p.x, then the
optimal tax on capital imports is higher than if no foreign tax credits were given.
Equation (14) shows that the classical result for taxing capital imports in the
absence of foreign tax credits, jx=O, is optimal only when Tj,=ln• Also,
comparing equation (14') with (9), it is apparent that the seesaw relationship is not
symmetrical for the South's two international taxes (p.x and Taxes on capital
imports affect capital imports, capital exports and the domestic capital stock
(because raising increases domestic interest rates), whereas capital export
taxes only affect capital imports and exports in this model. Thus, the optimal
setting for involves trading off forgone arbitrage gains from capital exports
against welfare losses from an inefficient domestic capital stock. This tradeoff is
given by 6 in (14) and (14').19 If 8=0 then increasing ji has no effect on the
domestic capital stock and so (14') gives a seesaw result similar to (9).20 The
larger is 5, the larger is the (inefficient) reduction in the domestic capital stock per
dollar of arbitrage, and the lower the optimal value of .
The above analysis was based on the assumption that the Northappliesthe
deduction approach to Northerners investing in the South. Now consider the case
19Findlay (1986) identities a similar tradeoff.
20Fn,m (1 2a), 6 = 0 implies either cr0 or g" is infinite (assuming tax rates less than 100%).
15in which the North uses a limited foreign tax credit system to alleviate double
taxation.
First, recall that under the Northern foreign tax credit system, v,, =max(t,).
Thus, if then and avia1.t=o. Increasinghas no effect on K,
and therefore does not alter the private attractiveness of domestic investment
(W55) relative to àapital exports (W,). As inspection of equation (5) makes clear,
increasing L' merely reduces the social cost of capital imports by the amount of
the additional tax revenue collected (g Wdp3) and has no effect on any other
real variable. Therefore, maximising Southern income requires ji ￿ t.
If where is the value of g,. that satisfies (14), then J.t*,is is optimal.
This reflects the fact that increases in g, beyond ;. affect real variables in the
same way as it does if the North uses a deduction system, and therefore
maximising Southern income involves the same tradeoffs encountered under the
deduction system,
In summary, the South should always ensure that at a minimum= t5 in order
to soak up foreign tax credits provided by the North without raising the domestic
cost of capital. This is optimal even if the seesaw result in (14) suggests J1, C tns.
The seesaw result in (14) should be adhered to provided it suggests setting
Miis> t,.g.
6.Maximislng Total Southern Welfare
When both p.t and can be chosen optimally, this model generates the
classical results: set equal to zero and set is,,, equal to p, allowing a
deduction for foreign taxes.






16As long as 6 is positive, the first-order conditions represented by equations (9)
and (14) are both satisfied only when = o.If is = 0, then r = from
equation (9). If the South uses the deduction approach to double tax relief, then = =and we have the classical NWM result for capital exports. In other
words, for a given positive value of 1.i, levying is a more efficient means of
satisfying the seesaw principle than levying it,, because using involves
avoidable welfare losses from distorting the domestic capital stock, whereas
only affects capital exports.
If the North provides foreign tax credits to the South, the optimal outcome is to set
lIns = 'r in order to soak up foreign tax credits, and set ii at the level that
satisfies the seesaw result of (9).
7.ConclusIons and Issues for Further Research
The paper shows that the classical results for taxing capital exports and imports
are optimal only if both taxes can be set at their classical level. Many countries
are restricted, however, In how they tax capital exports and imports, particularly in
regard to double tax agreements, but also because of economic considerations
(such as foreign tax credits on capital imports) or because of the domestic political
environment.
When a country cannot impose the classical tax rates, a seesaw type relationship
exists, where the optimal tax on capital exports (imports) is inversely related to the
fixed tax rate on capital imports (exports). The seesaw principle describes
combinations of international and domestic taxes that achieve a second-best
optimum for these situations. Perhaps the most surprising result is that, with a
fixed tax rate on capital imports, the level of crediting of capital imports has no
affect on the optimal level of capital export taxes. In all other cases, however,
credits on exports and imports directly affect optimal tax rates.
If international tax policy employs the seesaw principle, domestic investors acting
in their own profit-maximising interests will choose the socially optimal level of
capital exports and capital imports, given the constraints on feasible tax
arrangements. A country which does not adhere to the basic seesaw principle
causes investors, acting individually, to produce a collective outcome for the
country that is similar to a bank borrowing money at a higher interest rate than the
rate it charges on its loans. The country essentially gives away national income
since the social cost of capital imports exceeds the social return from capita!
exports. This can only be justified if capital export taxes are fixed. In this case,
the extent to which capital import taxes can be used to reduce such losses is
limited by the trade-off with distortions to the domestic capital stock.
17Applying the results to a multi-country framework is straightforward provided
capital imports are taxed uniformly. The object is to levy the same net tax on all
capital exports, which would be achieved with the deduction approach.In
contrast, commonly-used crediting methods would be suboptimal, because they
result in uneven net tax burdens on exports to different countries.
The results regarding capital exports alter the standard view (expressed, for
example, in Slemrod (1994)), that while full taxation with deductibility is optimal
from a national perspective, from a global perspective it leads to inefficient double
taxation of foreign investment. From the perspective of this paper, for a country
which is constrained to tax capital imports, full taxation is no longer nationally
optimal.
There are a number of directions in which the seesaw analysis could be extended.
For instance, a domestic savings elasticity could be introduced into the small open
economy model. While the basic seesaw result in section 4 would not be affected,
the asymmetry in the seesaw result of section 5 (represented by 5) would be
mitigated by the effects of the savings elasticity. Dropping the small country
assumption is another obvious area for further analysis. This is likely to produce a
weaker seesaw relationship in section 4, as changes in capital export taxes would
produce "terms of trade" type effects on capital imports. We also speculate that it
would reduce the magnitude of 5 in section 5. More fundamental extensions
could be made building a "two-goode general equilibrium model to relax the
assumption that domestic and foreign capital are perfect substitutes in domestic
production. This would drive the results back towards that produced by the
classical analysis. Further analysis to confirm these predictions will hopefully be
the subject of future research.
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